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THE FUTURE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS:
A COMMENT ON ELLICKSON
RICHARD

A.

POSNER*

Very well, I shall speak t-briefly-to Professor Ellickson's two theses. The first is that the "market share" of law and economics in the
legal-education market has stopped growing, partly because the potential
applications of economics to law that are accessible to persons who have
limited formal training in economics have been made, partly (a related
point) because the potential of the neoclassical model of economics to
illuminate legal phenomena is nearing exhaustion. The second thesis is
that the upward growth of law and economics will resume if economic
analysts of law enrich their models with insights from other social sciences, such as psychology and sociology. I shall discuss each thesis in
turn.
I.
Ellickson does not argue that the number and the scholarly output
of law professors who do economic analysis of law have stopped growing,
and I would be surprised if they had. He argues, with some empirical
support, that the fraction of legal teaching and scholarship that is economic in character has stopped growing. This judgment may be premature. The evidence that Ellickson is able to marshal for it is not
powerful, especially given his decision to confine his search for evidence
to four "elite" law schools that, if the truth be told, are increasingly difficult to distinguish from a number of other fine law schools. But assuming that his judgment is correct, I would stress four reasons different
from his as to why it is correct. The first is that the relative as distinct
from the absolute growth of one component of legal education must
eventually slow, and then stop. This is a matter of arithmetic. Economic
analysis can never constitute more than 100 percent of legal teaching and
scholarship, and therefore it cannot grow indefinitely relative to other
fields of academic law. Second and related, recent years have seen the
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University
of Chicago Law School.
1. The last paragraph of Professor Ellickson's article, on which I have been asked to comment.
reads in its entirety, "Speak. Posner.' Ellickson. Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational
Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics. 65 CHi.-KENI L. Ri v. 23. 55 (1988) (Professor
Ellickson's article appears in this symposium issue).
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growth of other interdisciplinary fields of legal studies, such as feminist
jurisprudence, law and literature, and critical legal studies; the latter two
2
fields are regarded in some quarters as reactions to law and economics.
Room had to be made for these new fields in the curriculum; since the
conventional curriculum could give only so far, law and economics may
have had to yield some ground to the newcomer fields. Third, law and
economics is a victim of its success. Many of its practitioners have
achieved a measure of prominence, have experienced enhanced demand
for their services, and have been drawn off into other activities-consulting, practice, judging-which have diminished their academic productivity, in some cases to zero. Its acolytes have broader opportunities than
other young lawyers. A law school graduate with a command of economics has enormous earnings potential in the private practice of law,
and law schools are reluctant to pay the level of salary necessary to attract these graduates into teaching. It is cheaper to fill teaching slots
with refugees from the humanities, alumni of public-interest firms, and
aspiring constitutional lawyers.
The fourth reason for a possible slowing in the growth of law and
economics is the most important. A social science cannot progress far
without empirical research to test its theories. This is true of economic
analysis of law. It is challenging and fascinating to build models of dispute settlement, optimal deterrence, joint-tortfeasor liability, products liability with risk aversion and incomplete information, and the like, but if
the models are never confronted with data, the advance of knowledge is
slight. Rules and case outcomes are data, along with the more familiar
statistical data; "qualitative data" is not an oxymoron. But the economic
analyst of law cannot rest content with offering economic explanations
for doctrines and decisions, any more than he (or she) can rest content
with proposing formal models that are increasingly complex and therefore increasingly difficult to test with data of any kind. Ellickson points
out, and rightly so, that as economics becomes more specialized, the ability of lawyers to contribute to the theoretical part of economic analysis of
law diminishes. But a more important point, I believe, is that law professors have neither training nor taste for systematic empirical research,
which would inevitably involve statistical analysis. Fortunately, collaboration between lawyers and economists is possible, and in addition more
and more practitioners of law and economics have both a law degree and
a Ph.D. in economics. Nevertheless it continues to be the case that a
2. See. e.g.. Fiss. The Challenge Ahead. I YALE J. LAw & HUMANITIIES viii (1988).
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disproportionate share of economic studies of law lack a substantial empirical component.
In emphasizing these explanations for the apparent leveling off of
the growth of economics in the handful of elite law schools that Ellickson
examined, I do not mean to disparage Ellickson's explanations. It is true
that as a field becomes more specialized, nonspecialists are increasingly
at a disadvantage; and most law professors are nonspecialists when it
comes to economics. It is not so easy to make a splash today with the
application of an extremely simple economic model to law as it was
twenty years ago. The other side of this particular coin is that simple
models didn't seem so simple then as they do now from the vantage point
of an increasingly technical discipline, and that it took a certain boldness
to apply economics to law twenty years ago which is not required today.
Ellickson is also correct to point out that the practitioners of law
and economics have pressed their researches into areas where the simple
economic model of rationally self-interested actors seems inadequate. It
is indeed frustrating to try to explain judicial behavior by incentives,
when the whole object in designing judicial institutions is to divorce judicial decisions from the judges' incentives. The frontier of a discipline can
also be a boundary.
II.
Well, what is to be done? An anterior question is, Why should anyone be concerned with expanding the role of economics in law schools?
Isn't it large enough already? The only warranted reason for answering
"no" would be a well-grounded belief that, at the margin, economic
teaching and research are more valuable, more promising, than alternative uses of law school resources. I happen to hold this belief, but I am
not sure that Ellickson does-or given his views, should-and I am
therefore a little puzzled as to why he is concerned about law and economics' "loss of upward trajectory." A reader of his paper might come
away with the impression that Ellickson thinks the real growth areas of
interdisciplinary legal studies are psychology and sociology rather than
economics, and, if this impression is correct, it is not clear why Ellickson
wants economically inclined lawyers to borrow insights from psychology
and sociology rather than wanting psychologically and sociologically inclined lawyers to barrel full-speed ahead, perhaps picking up some economic insights along the way. But I suspect that what Ellickson actually
believes is that the economic model is the most promising starting-point
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in the design of models, and that what is needed therefore is not an alternative model but merely a modified or elaborated one.
If this is right-if his suggestion is that law professors having an
economic bent not jump the economic ship but merely enrich their economic models with insights from other social sciences, and thus incorporate such concepts as cognitive dissonance, bounded rationality, the
divided self, ideology, and altruism-I have the following comments.
First, as Ellickson recognizes, economic analysts of law (himself included) have begun to do this, and in no grudging way either. Altruism
and information costs already play an important role in the economic
analysis of law, and there is growing attention to the important form of
negative altruism that we call vengeance and that has played a shaping
role in legal institutions. 3 To some extent, therefore, Ellickson is preaching to the converted. In this connection, his correct emphasis on the
gradual erasure of lines among the different social sciences cuts against
his recommendations. We can see that much of what passes for sociolog4
ical or anthropological research on law is implicitly economic.
Second, it is obscure to me how immersion in additional social sciences can be the lawyer's answer to the increasingly technical character
of economics. Granted, these other social sciences are not yet as mathematical as economics and are therefore more accessible to a person who
has only a legal education. But, as I have already intimated, there is a
danger of information overload if the economically-minded lawyer feels
obliged to become a master of additional social sciences as well.
Third, there is such a thing as an embarrassment of riches. The
lawyer who is as conversant with a broad range of social sciences as Professor Ellickson is should be able to explain any legal phenomenon by a
judicious blending of hypotheses drawn from different social sciences. So
eclectic an analyst should be able to construct an explanatory hypothesis
for any observation. But, to overstate a bit, if a theory (call it the "enriched" economic theory of human behavior) cannot be falsified by data
because it is consistent with all possible observations, it cannot be confirmed either. To put this slightly differently, Ellickson chiefly wants to
mine other social sciences for additional explanations. It is not clear how
3. See, e.g., R. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 25-70

(1988).
4. A striking example is Stewart Macauley's famous article on contract, Non-ContractualRelations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963)-in retrospect a prescient

anticipation of contemporary economic analysis of self-enforcing contracts. On the parallels between functional anthropology and economic analysis of law, see my article A Theoy of Primitive
Society. with Special Rejfrence to Low. 23 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1980).
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this procedure will enlarge our knowledge of the legal system. To do
that we need more empirical research.
I can make the same point slightly differently by noting the magpielike quality of Ellickson's interest in noneconomic social sciences. He
does not seem to want to draw from them broad organizing principles
that could be used to generate a variety of hypotheses or build new models of the legal system. Maybe they have no such principles. At all
events, he seems to view these other fields as sources of random bits of
information about human nature or society that the economist can paste
into his models, as indeed economists are beginning to do. But these
random bits are so numerous that, to repeat a previous point, the danger
is acute that the economist will achieve total freedom in the design of his
models.
I see this as a movement away from the central need in the economic
analysis of law, which is not for broader reading in other disciplines but
for the use of scientific methods to enlarge our meager knowledge of the
legal enterprise. The object of scientific research-and the aspiration of
economic analysis of law is to be scientific, whatever the achievements to
date-is to increase our ability to predict and control our environment,
in this case our social environment. The usual way this is done in science
is by advancing hypotheses, preferably bold and counterintuitive ones,
and confronting these hypotheses with data. If the data contradict a hypothesis, we have learned a lot. If they don't contradict it (even after
repeated testing), the scientific community will be encouraged to propose
related hypotheses, designed to test the principles on which the previous
hypothesis is thought to rest. Where scientific hypotheses come from
(Charles Sanders Peirce coined the word "abduction" to describe the
process by which scientists decide which of the infinite array of potential
hypotheses is worth testing) 5 is a mystery and also a detail, although an
important one. The big thing is to come up with hypotheses that have a
sufficiently low antecedent probability of being true to be interesting, but
that are not so ridiculous that the results of testing them empirically are
a foregone conclusion, and to get on with the testing of them. Whether
the hypotheses that legal scholars test by confronting them with data on
number of cases, frequency and severity of punishments, crime rates,
damage awards, judicial affirmances, settlement rates, appeals rates , and
the other abundant but neglected data on the legal system come from

5.

Pierce, Abduction and Induction, in PHIL OSOPHICAI WRITINGS OF PEiRCi 151 (J. Buchler

ed. 1955).
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psychology, sociology, economics, or some other social science is unimportant. The important thing is to get on with the testing.
Nevertheless, since there isn't time to test all the plausible hypotheses about social behavior, it would be a mistake to abandon the economic
model-the most fruitful in the history of the social sciences-prematurely in favor of alternative models with an inferior track record. Professor Ellickson doesn't want to abandon the economic model but to
improve it, but too many bells and whistles will stop the analytic engine
in its tracks. A commitment to a relatively simple economic model, one
that does not supply a facile explanation for every regularity (or peculiarity) in human behavior, forces the analyst to think hard before discarding
the possibility that the behavior under scrutiny may indeed be rational in
a straightforward sense. By the same token, a too-great readiness to
abandon the simple model in favor of alternative approaches to behavior
at the first sign of difficulty carries the risk of overlooking promising avenues for economic analysis. For example, Ellickson suggests that the explanation for the fact (if it is a fact) that long-time tenants are often
permitted to renew their leases at below-market rates is cultural. An
alternative, economic possibility is overlooked: The long-time tenant is
presumably a "good" tenant-otherwise the landlord would not have renewed his lease so many times. Such a tenant imposes fewer costs on the
landlord than a "bad" tenant. It makes economic sense, therefore, that
he should receive a discount. Similarly, while the reduction in industrial
accidents (if there was such a reduction) by reason of adopting workmen's compensation may have been due to cognitive dissonance as Ellickson speculates, instead it may have been due to workers' rational
ignorance of industrial hazards, especially at a time when many industrial workers were recent immigrants, not previously employed in the
industrial sector, who may have lacked information about such hazards.

